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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
DELROY PORTER and KEITH W
BETTRIDGE dba PORTER &
BETTRIDGE,

)

Plaintiff/Respondant,

)

Case No. 20,956

vs
LARRY B. GROOVER,
Defendant/Appellant

]

BRIEF OF APPELLANT
STATEMENT AND NATURE OF THE CASE
Plaintiffs/Respondents (herein after referred to as
Plaintiff) brought this action to recover upon two partially
unpaid assignment of claims received from the Assignors and
real parties in interest, Karen Edwards and Judy C. Smith.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
The Trial Court ruled that there was not sufficient
evidence to pierce the corporate veil in which the
Defendant/Appellant (hereinafter referred to as Defendant or
Mr. Groover) owned stock and which employed Mr. Groover, Karen
Edwards and Judy C. Smith.

(R. 382, Addendum 1,3.)

However,

the Trial Court gave Judgment to the Plaintiff against
Mr. Groover personally for $6,110.50 on Karen Edward's claim
and for $1,210.00 on Judy C. Smith's claim.
1.)

(R. 382, Addendum

The Lower Court ruled that there was consideration for a

contract; however, the consideration and resulting liability

went to Mr. Groover personally.

(R. 381, Addendum 1,3.)

The

Trial Court further ruled that there was not technically a
condition precedent upon which the contract was dependent and,
therefore, contractual liability existed.

(R. 382, Addendum 3.)

NATURE OF RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
The Defendant seeks to have this Court reverse the Judgment
of the Trial Court and enter Judgment for the Defendant on the
basis that the evidence at trial established that there was no
consideration to support an agreement against the Defendant or
the corporations which employed Karen Edwards and Judy C. Smith
and that there was an unfulfilled condition precedent thus
removing any contractual duty to perform.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
During the summer and fall of 1980, Karen Edwards and Judy
C. Smith were hired by Groover Financial Management
Corporation.

(R. 74, 75 and 147.)

Defendant Larry Groover

owned stock in and was employed by this corporation.

(R. 233,

234. )
Defendant mentioned to Karen Edwards and Judy C. Smith
after they were hired that they were eligible for bonuses from
Groover Financial Management but the bonuses were dependent
upon receipt of insurance renewal premiums that the corporation
was servicing at the time for A. L. Williams Company.

They

were told that Groover Financial Management would allocate ten
percent (10%) of these premiums renewals to the employees who
qualified for bonuses.

(R. 77, 79 and 294; see also
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Plaintiffs1 Ex. No. 6.)

Other bonuses such as trips and

Christmas bonuses were also given.

(R. 298.)

In 1982f a corporation change occurred from Groover
Financial Management to Balanced Financial Management.

The

Defendant, Mr. Groover was chairman of the new corporation
Balanced Financial (R. 241 and 324.)

(R. 296.)

A corporation

called Managed Accounting Services was formed and hired to
provide accounting services for Balanced Financial Services.
(R 291.)

Karen Edwards eventually ended up working for Managed

Accounting Services and its President Hal Rosen.
R.246.)

(R. 322 and

The bonus program remained the same inasmuch as

Balanced Financial serviced the life insurance policies that
Groover Financial had serviced previously.

(R. 297.)

Balanced

Financial, however, expanded its work to enhance and promote
new or developing corporations and therefore would consider
also purchasing stock in the developing corporations when they
went public and would give the stock to the employee as
bonuses.

(R. 297.)

While Karen Edwards and Judy C. Smith were

working for Balanced Financial Management, one of the companies
which was being promoted was San Saba.

Balanced Financial

Management made investments in San Saba and was anticipating
that the company would go public.

(R. 248, 250,

304 and

305.)
On April 13, 1983, Karen Edwards went to Mr. Groover's
office to resign.

(R. 88.)

An agreement was reached at that

time whereby $2,500.00 would be paid in cash and $5,000.00 of
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stock in San Saba, or the cash to buy the stock if it went
public would be given.

(R. 248.)

The agreement was prepared

by Karen Edwards and signed by Defendant.

(R. 90, 127; see

Plaintiff's Ex. 5, Addendum 4.)
On or about April 28, 1983, Judy C. Smith visited with
Defendant Groover concerning the payment of additional money as
she wished to terminate her relationship with Balanced
Financial Management.

As a result of the discussion, a

memorialization of a second agreement was also made.

(See

Ex. 8, R. 162, 163, Addendum 4.)
Karen Edwards received $2,500.00 and Judy C. Smith received
$1,000.00 which was the cash portion as itemized in their
respective agreements. (R.93, 165.)
After Karen Edwards and Judy C. Smith left the corporations
they assigned their claims to DeLoy Porter and Keith W.
Bettridge, d.b.a. Porter & Bettridge, the Plaintiffs and
Respondents in this case, Porter & Bettridge then brought an
action to collect on the alleged agreements.
Neither Judy Smith nor Karen Edwards were ever employed by
Defendant Larry Groover individually.

Defendant Larry Groover

was never an officer or director in Managed Accounting
Services, from which Karan Edwards got paid.
324.)

(R. 93, 234,

The Court held, however, that Defendant received

personal benefit from this. (Addendum 1 ) .

-4-

ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN IT HELD THERE WAS CONSIDERATION
FOR A CONTRACT.
A.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN IT RULED THAT PLAINTIFF
PROVIDED CONSIDERATION FOR A CONTRACT TO THE DEFENDANT
SINCE THE EVIDENCE AT TRIAL WAS TO THE CONTRARY.

The Trial Court erred when it ruled that there was
consideration sufficient enough for a contract to bind the
Defendant Larry Groover individually, to pay Plaintiffs.

This

was contrary to the evidence which was adduced at trial.
This Court in Resource Management Company v. Weston Ranch
and Livestock Company, Inc., 706 P.2d 1028 (Utah 1985) held:
"The law does not enforce all promises. For a promise to
be legally enforceable, it must be supported by
consideration. Manwill v. Oyler, 11 Utah 2d 433, 436, 361
P.2d 177, 178 (1961); 17 C.J.S. Contracts, Section 71
(1963.)"
706 P.2d at 1036.
In Resource Management this Court further defined
consideration:
"Consideration is an act or promise bargained for and given
in exchange for a promise. Simmons v. California Institute
of Technology, 34 Cal. 2d 264, 272, 209 P.2d 581, 586
(1949); see Colorado National Bank of Denver v. Bohm, 286
F.2d 494, 496 (9th Cir. 1961)."
706 P.2d at 1036.
The Second Restatement of Contracts also sets forth what
the requirement of exchange and the types of exchanges that
would support the requirement of consideration.
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"Section 75. Requirement of Exchange; Types of Exchanges.
(1) To constitute consideration, a performance or a
return promised must be bargained for.
(2) A performance or return promise is bargained for
if it is sought by the promissor in exchange for his
promise and is given by the promisee in exchange for
that promise.
(3) Performance may consist of:
(1) an act other than a promise or
(2) a forbearance or
(3) the creation, modification or destruction of
a legal relation.
(4) The performance or return promise may be
given to the promisor or to some other person.
It may be given by the promisee or by some other
person.
The law regarding considerations outlined above, when applied
to the facts at hand, indicates the error of the Trial Court.
At trial, Karen Edwards testified and admitted that she
had:

(1) received all of the salary that she had been promised

(R. 109); (2) received salary increases during the time period
she was employed with the corporation (R. 109, 110); (3)
received bonuses including a Mexico cruise, $50.00 cash bonus,
Christmas bonuses, and trip to Disneyland (R. 109 to 111.); and
taken a half a day a per week off for roughly a six-month
period.

Furthermore, Karen Edwards admitted at trial she knew

that the existence or non-existence of any bonus was dependent
upon whether or not there was sufficient funds in the
corporation to make those bonuses.

(R. 115, 116.)

Judy C. Smith testified at trial that she had received and
participated in the cruise to Mexico and trip to Disneyland.
Judy C. Smith testified that at the time of the negotiation of
the agreement for the promise to pay her $5,000.00 to purchase
San Saba stock, that she gave Mr. Groover nothing in return at
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that point in time.

(R. 169, 170.)

(Emphasis added.)

Furthermore, she testifed she received full payment for the
overtime worked when on an hourly basis and had received her
entire salary until she terminated her employment.
171.)

(R. 170,

Therefore, no consideration was provided to the

corporation, let alone Groover individually, at the time of the
agreement.
Judy C. Smith testified and admitted at trial that her
reason and basis for holding the discussions with Mr. Groover
and entering into the agreement was based upon her past hard
work and her feeling that she was entitled to something.
(R. 154, 155.)
The law is clear that past consideration is no
consideration at all.

Williston On Contracts, Second Edition,

Section 142, discusses past consideration:
"The term past consideration or executed consideration is
self-contradictory. Consideration, by its very definition,
must be given in exchange for a promise or in at least in
reliance upon a promise. Accordingly something which has
been given before the promise was made and therefore
without reference to it cannot properly speaking be legal
consideration. As a general principle this is well
recognized and illustrations might easily be multiplied to
show it."
Williston On Contracts, p. 620-621.
Furthermore, past consideration has been considered not
sufficient consideration to support a contract in case law.
Blonder v. Gentile, 309 P.2d 47(Cal. 1957); see also Johnson v.
Hazaleus, 338 P.2d 345, (Okla. 1959); Wantulok v. Wantulok, 214
P.2d 477.(Wyo. 1950); Smith v. Recrion Corp., 541 P.2d 663
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(Nev. 1975); Matter of Mariotte's Estate, 619 P.2d 1068 (Ariz.
1980); and Clark County v. Bonanza No. 1, 615 P.2d 939, ( Nev.
1980).
B.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN IT RULED THERE WAS PERSONAL
CONSIDERATION TO DEFENDANT RATHER THAN THE CORPORATON
THAT EMPLOYED PLAINTIFFS.

Karen Edwards and Judy C. Smith testified they gave or
promised nothing to Defendant Groover at the time the
agreements were signed.

(R. 169, 170.)

Nor was there any other testimony presented as to the
consideration Mr. Groover was to personally receive in exchange
for the Agreement.

Thus, Mr. Groover's testimony that a gift

was intended stands undisputed.

(R. 303.)

The Trial Court in rendering judgment found that
Mr. Groover had received consideration on the basis that he
hired the employees for the corporation, the employees worked
for several entities directed by Mr. Groover, that Mr. Groover
was interested in the success of the corporations in which he
owned stock because he occassionally pledged personal assets to
support the corporations.

(R. 381, Addendum 3.)

The Trial Court overlooked the fact that Judy C. Smith and
Karen Edwards testified they knew they worked for a corporation
and received their paychecks from the corporation and not
Mr. Groover.

Secondly, by the very nature of the corporate

existence, some individual must hire employees for the
corporation.

Thirdly, the fact Mr. Groover owned interest in
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and directed several corporations that employed Karen Edwards
and Judy C. Smith is not in and of itself sufficient to rule
Mr, Groover received personal consideration, especially in view
of the fact the Trial Court ruled there was not sufficient
evidence to pierce the corporate veil.
Finally, the fact that owners of small, closely held
businesses pledge personal assets as collateral for
corporations is not a valid legal reason to render personal
liability, especially in light of today's banking practices and
since the corporate veil was not pierced.
POINT II
II.

ASSUMING, ARGUENDO, THAT A CONTRACT EXISTED, AN
UNFULFILLED CONDITION PRECEDENT PREVENTS PERFORMANCE
OF THE CONTRACT

The law is clear that a condition precedent removes any
legal duty to perform.
Williston on Contracts, Third Edition §663 p. 126, states:
"Section 663. A condition precedent is a fact or event
which the parties intend must exist or take place before
there is a right to performance. A condition is
distinguished from a promise in that it creates no right or
duty in and of itself but is merely a limiting or modifying
factor. If the condition is not fulfilled, the right to
enforce the contract does not come into existence. Whether
a provision in the contract is a condition of a non
fulfillment of which excuses performance depends upon the
intent of the parties, to be ascertained from a fair and
reasonable construction of the language used in light of
all the surrounding circumstances when they executed the
contract.
"It is ordinarily said that a condition must be something
future and uncertain and it is undoubtedly true that at
least from the standpoint of the parties both futurity and
uncertainty are necessary elements. If to their knowledge
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the event has either already happened or cannot possibly
happen, the promise is either absolutel or nugatory from
the outset."
Williston On Contract, p. 126.
The decisions of this Court are consistent with Williston.
In Creer v. Thurman, 581 P. 2d 149 (Utah 1978) this Court held:
"Whether a provision in a contract is a condition, the
nonfulfillfillment of which excuses performance depends
upon the intent of the parties, to be ascertained from a
fair and reasonable construction of the language used in
light of all of the circumstances where they executed the
contract.f"
581 P. 2d at p. 151.

The evidence adduced a t t r i a l proves t h e r e was an
unfullfilled

c o n d i t i o n precedent of San Saba stock going p u b l i c

and the T r i a l Court e r r e d in r u l i n g to the c o n t r a r y .
The Court e r r e d in holding t h e r e was s u f f i c i e n t

evidence to

r e b u t the Defendant's evidence of a c o n d i t i o n p r e c e d e n t .
5, 8, Addendum 4.)

(Ex.

Judy C. Smith t e s t i f i e d a t t r i a l t h a t she

knew San Saba stock was going to be issued and t h a t she was to
accumulate i t .

(R. 168.)

She f u r t h e r

testified

to r e c e i v e 5,000 of San Saba s h a r e s of s t o c k .

t h a t she was
(R. 169.)

The testimony a t t r i a l was as f o l l o w s :
"QUESTION: At the time you n e g o t i a t e d the agreement t h a t
you have now in front of you, Mr. Groover gave to you a
promise to pay you as you understand i t $5,000.00 for the
purchase of San Saba s t o c k . Is t h a t c o r r e c t ?
"ANSWER:

That's

correct."

(R. 169.)
Moreover, Ms. Smith testified that she dated the agreement
as of September 1, 1983, on the basis that that is when she
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believed the corporation would be going public and she was to
receive her stock at that time, thus indicating that there was
a condition (of going public) on her receiving the stock.
Further testimony was that Judy C. Smith understood that the
$5,000.00 was for a specific stock purchase and that that stock
was San Saba public stock.

(R. 168.)

The Agreements and the law support the condition
precedent.

The agreements provide that the employees were to

get the cash to buy the stock.

The law requires that if stock

were given directly to an employee it would have to be
restricted stock.

Therefore, in order to get unrestricted

stock to the employee, the purchase of the stock had to be with
cash, after a public offering.
The condition precedent in the agreement was substantiated
by testimony from Mr. Groover.

(R. 234, 235, 236, 237.)

It

was further substantiated by the testimony of Kathy Lowder (P.
269) who participated in the meeting with Judy Smith and
Richard Wiser at the time of the corporation's discussion of
the San Saba bonus stock.

Kathy Lowder's testimony was that

they, the employees, would receive stock in San Saba,
contingent upon it being publicly issued.

(R. 269.)

Karen Edwards testified that she asked for the entire
$7,500.00 bonus in cash and that Mr. Groover had refused, and
instead specifically tied the payment of the remaining
$5,000.00 to the issuance, and her purchase, of the San Saba
stock.

(R. 127.)

Karen Edwards testified (R. 127) that she
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frequently

checked t o s e e when t h e San Saba s t o c k would be

i s s u e d b e c a u s e s h e had an i n t e r e s t
that's

in i t b e i n g i s s u e d

t h e t i m e when she f e l t s h e c o u l d r e c e i v e t h e

and p u r c h a s e t h e

since

$5,000.00

stock.

The p u b l i c o f f e r i n g of San Saba s t o c k never took p l a c e and
t h u s t h e c o n d i t i o n p r e c e d e n t h a s n o t o c c u r r e d which would
create a contractual

d u t y on t h e p a r t of t h e c o r p o r a t i o n ,

t o mention Mr. G r o o v e r ,
the stock

individually,

to provide the cash

not
for

purchase.
CONCLUSION

The C o u r t s h o u l d r e v e r s e t h e d e c i s i o n of t h e T r i a l

Court

and h o l d t h a t t h e Defendant i s n o t p e r s o n a l l y l i a b l e for

the

d e b t s on t h e b a s i s of no c o n s i d e r a t i o n a n d / o r on t h e b a s i s of a
c o n d i t i o n p r e c e d e n t which has n o t
Respectfully

submitted t h i s

occurred.
l^fL

day of March,

1986.

NIELSEN & SENIOR
A t t o r n e y s for D e f e n d a n t /
Appellant
>•—^
E a r l JaCy Peck
By_
R o b e r t P.
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Faust

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that on the

day of March, 1986, I

mailed, postage prepaid, four copies of the foregoing Brief of
Appellant to John W. Call, Attorneys for the Plaintiffs/
Respondent at 211 East Broadway, Suite 213, Salt Lake City,
Utah

84111.
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ADDENDUM

FILMED I
TOHN W. CALL #0542
of HENRIKSEN, HENRIKSEN & CALL, P.C.
Attorney for Plaintiff
320 South 500 East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102
Telephone (801) 521-4145
IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF SALT LAK*" COUNTY
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT, STATE OF UTAH

6ta.

DELOY PORTER and K^TTH W.
BF^TRIDGE dba PORTER &
BETTRIDGF,
Plaintiffs,

BLOO MO.

\Qcpy

J U D G M E N T
Civil

No.

£4tW>£fr9-

LARRY H. GROOVER,
Defendant.
Following trial in the above cause on August 22 and 23,
1985, the Honorable Scott Daniels, District Judge presiding, the
Court made an entered its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of
Law.

Therefore, it is hereby
ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED as follows:
1.

Plaintiffs, on behalf of the real party in

interest Karen Edwards, are awarded a judgment against the
defendant in the sum of $5,000, together with interest due
thereon at the rate of 10% from June 1, 1983, in the sum of
$1,110.50, for a total of $6,110.50, the same to accrue interest
at the rate of 12% per annum until paid.
2.

Plaintiffs, on behalf of the real party in interest

Judy Smith, are awarded a judgment against the defendant in the sum
of $1,000, together with interest due thereon at the rate of 10%
from September 1, 1983, in the sum of $210, for a total of $1,210,
14

**.r*

the same to accrue interest from the date of judgment herein at
the rate of 12% per annum until paid.
3.

Plaintiffs are awarded their reasonable costs of

$34, the same to accrue interest at the rate of 12% per annum
from the date of entry herein, until paid.
DATFD this

H

day of September, 1985.
BY THF COURT:

y^«
k

v

J) £ ^ — ^ \

• ;

~

Scott Daniels
District Judge

CFRTIFICATF OF HAND DELIVERY
T hereby certify that I hand delivered a true and
correct copy of the foregoing Judgement this J_

day of

September, 1985 to the following:
Charles Hanna
KFSLFR & RUST
2000 Beneficial Life Tower
36 S. State St.
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

15
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rjo'3

JOHN W. CALL #0542
of HENRIKSEN, HFNRIKSFN & CALL, P.C.
Attorney for Plaintiffs
320 South 500 East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102
Telephone (801) 521-4145

',. \MyLf JO iOu^cJ

IN THF CIRCUIT COURT OF SALT LAKF COUNTY
IN AND FOR SALT LAKF DEPARTMENT, STATE OF UTAH
DELOY PORTER and KEITH W.
BETTRIDGF dba PORTER &
BETTRIDGE,
FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

Plaintiffs,

y ° -*

v.

Civil No. a4CJ£51£9LARRY H. GROOVER,
Defendant.
The above cause came on for trial on August 22 and 23,
1985, the Honorable Scott Daniels, District Judge, presiding.
Plaintiffs' real parties in interest were present and represented
by John W. Call.

Defendant was represented by Charles W. Hanna.

Fach of the parties presented sworn testimony and documentary
evidence.

Having fully considered the evidence, the court now

makes and enters the following:
FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

By prior oral stipulation of the parties, there is

no evidence to support the defendants Third-Party Complaint.
2.

Karen Edwards and Judy Smith, the plaintiffs1 real

parties in interest were employed by corporations controlled by
the defendant prior to April, 1983.

16
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3.

The defendant promised various employees including

Karen Edwards and Judy Smith, that they would be entitled to
bonus compensation from the defendant's personal assets, in
exchange for their efforts
4.

The promised bonuses from personal assets were not

paid by the defendant prior to April, 1983.
5.

Tn April, 1983 Karen Fdwards approached the

defendant and tendered her resignation and requested the promised
bonus compensation.
6.

Karen Edwards and the defendant entered into a

settlement agreement, dated April 13, 1983, which in part,
obligated the defendant to pay to the plaintiff the sum of $5,000
in cash, on June 1, 1983, to make her own purchase of stock in
San Saba Energy.
7.

Judy Smith approached the defendant on April 28,

1983 to sign a similar agreement whereby defendant, in part,
promised to pay to Judy Smith between $1,000 to $5,000 in cash on
September 1, 1983, to make her own purchase of stock in San Saba
Energy.
8.

Each of the employment termination settlement

agreements were intended by the parties as a compromise of the
bonus compensation claimed by Karen Edwards and Judy Smith and
not paid by the defendant during the course of their employment.
9.

Each of the documents reduced the agreement of

employment and bonus compensation to writing at the time the
termination of Karen Edwards and Judy Smith's employment,
respectively.
17

10.

The public issue of the San Saba Energy stock was

not permitted by the U. S. Securities and Exchange Commission.
11.

The public issue of the San Saba Fnergy stock was

not a condition precedent to the defendant's obligation to pay
$5,000 to Karen Edwards and $1,000 to Judy Smith.
12.

Tt is unnecessary for the plaintiffs' real parties

in interest to pierce the corporate veil of various of the
defendant's business entities, in that the agreements signed by
the defendant were in his individual capacity, and that he
received a personal benefit and personal consideration from the
services of Karen Edwards and Judy Smith.
13.

Karen Edwards and Judy Smith made demand upon the

defendant for payment of said obligations which demand was
refused.
Having made and entered the foregoing Findings of Fact,
the Court now makes and enters the following:
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

Defendant's Third-Party Complaint should be

dismissed, with prejudice.
2.

Plaintiff should be awarded judgment, in behalf of

their real party in interest Karen Edwards, against the defendant
Larry B. Groover in the sum of $5,000, together with interest due
thereon at the rate of 10% per annum from June 1, 1983.
3.

Plaintiffs should be awareded judgment, in behalf

of their real party in interest Judy Smith, against the defendant
Larry B. Groover in the sum of $1,000, together with interest
accrued thereon at the rate of 10% per annum from September 1, 1983.
18

4.

Plaintiff is awarded its reasonable costs incurred

in this action.
5.

The judgment entered herein shall accrue interest

at the rate of 12% per annum from the date of entry.
DATED this

?

^

day of September, 1985.

Scott Darriretrs
District Judge

i

CERfl^lC^E OF HAND DELIVERY
T hereby certify that I hand delivered a true and
correct copy of the foregoing Finding of Fact and Conclusions of
Law this J

day of September, 1985 to the following:
Charles Hanna
KFSLFP & RUST
2000 Beneficial Life Tower
36 S. Main
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
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Groover personally, not in a representative capacity, which
raises the presumption that he's personally liable.
Now, he tries to cloak himself in the corporate
veil.

And the evidence shows if he's going to do that,

we've first got to decide which corporate veil he's going
to cloak himself in.
dozen of them.

He had a dozen of them, almost a

And he ought to be concerned about his

personal liability when all these dozen corporations are
run out of the same office by him with people crossing over
back and forth, doing business back and forth, purely an
alter ego.
With regard to the cases on piercing the corporate veil, I don't know that to promote injustice is equivalent
to fraud.

I don't think it is.

I think the justice here

is Mr. Groover signing a note personally and then trying
to cloak himself in a corporate veil, which I think the
evidence really indicates that he cannot do.
We'd ask for a judgment in the amount of
$10,000.00.
THE COURT:

Thank you.

the case is Deloy Porter and Keith

Well, for the record,
W. Bettridge d.b.a.

Porter and Bettridge versus Larry B. Groover, C84-3858.
There are three issues, I guess, to be decided.
The first is whether the contract is supported
by consideration.

I considered this yesterday, and I
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thought about it some more, and I'm still convinced it is
supported by consideration.

That although there is con-

flicting testimony as between the parties on this matter,
which kind of balances out, really, I rely considerably
on the language and the documents as well as what was
testified to, but to the conclusion that we're not talking
about past consideration.

We1re talking about something

that was conceivably owed at the time of termination and
through negotiation was reduced to this agreement.

And

I think it is valuable consideration sufficient to support
a contract.

And therefore hold that there was consideration,

And going beyond that, I think that it was
consideration as to Mr. Groover personally because there's
some evidence that both of these people were hired by Mr.
Groover personally, they worked for a number of different
entities that were directed by him.
in a personal--his personal capacity.

He signed the contract
He was interested

in the success of his various corporations as indicated
by the fact he occasionally pledged personal assets and
so forth to support those corporations.

So I think the

contract, the agreements here were supported by consideration and were supported by consideration personally to
Mr. Groover.
Secondly, the issue of condition precedent,
again, I considered this yesterday at some length.

I
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1

considered it since that time.

2

issuance, the public issuance of the San Saba Stock was

3

not a condition precedent to the payment of the settlement

4

if

—if

the

And I think that the

documents were such that it was going to be paid

5

in stock, that might be different, but the agreement clearly

6

was that they were going to be paid in cash when the stock

7

went public so they could buy the stock.

8

partially so the net result, then, would be greater than

9

the cash amount.

And that was

But that, I don't think the issue, public

10

issuance of the stock, was technically a condition precedent

11

on which those contracts were dependent.

12

hold the issuance of the San Saba Stock was not a condition

13

precedent.

14

And therefore

Therefore, based on those conclusions alone,

15

I hold that Mr. Groover* is personally liable under both

16

of these agreements, liable to Ms. Edwards for $5,000.00.

17

But as to Ms. Smith, I don't see how I can hold him liable

18

for more than $1,000.00.

19

to Judy Smith, and I don't see how he can be held for any-

20

thing more than the minimum.

21

discretion whether it's 1,000 and 5,000, and therefore hold

22

he is liable to Ms. Smith for $1,000.00, to Ms. Edwards

23

for 5,000.

2

Her document says 1,000 to 5,000

Now, apparently, it's in his

4

i specifically find that there is not evidence

25

sufficient to pierce the corporate veil, but I think that
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1

they can recover against the person, nevertheless, because

2

the fact he entered into the contract personally and there

3

was consideration from him personally.

4

Mr. Call, I'll ask you to prepare a Findings

5

of Fact and Conclusions of Law consistent with that ruling

6

and a judgment in the amount of 5,000 as to one Plaintiff

7

and 1,000 as to the other, and submit to Mr. Hanna for

8

approval as to form.

9

MR. CALL:

10

THE COURT:

11 J

(Whereupon, the trial was concluded.)

I will, Your Honor.

Thank you,

Court will be in recess.

12
13 |

* * *

14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
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EXHIBIT "B'

13 A p r i l 1983

Tnis is written verification of a verbal employment settlement agreement
it 1 will receive $2,500.00 cash and $5,000.00 in San Saba Stock.

The

000 is to be paid in cash with the means to purchase the stock on a
•subscription agreement, expected to take Jilace approximately 1 June 1983.

]
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EXHIBIT

CJX

EXHIBIT "D"
AGREEMENT

This Agreement is to Wfify that on or about September 1, .1983,

I

\^Co TV ff^Wk .
vdll give $5,000 cash t y Judy Smith to purchase San Saba stock,

per our employment termination settlement of April 28, I983.

Judy

-

25
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EXHIBIT
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